PER CURIAM.
Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Garry Kirkland appeals from two decisions by the District Court (Preska, C.J.) granting Defendant-Appellee Cablevision Systems ("Cablevision") summary judgment and dismissing Kirkland's Title VII discrimination and retaliation complaint. According to Kirkland, who was, in 2008, Cablevision's only African-American Area Operations Manager ("AOM"), his former employer discriminated against him and ultimately fired him based on race. Kirkland also argues that Cablevision retaliated against him for repeatedly complaining to Human Resources about racial discrimination.
The District Court granted Cablevision summary judgment on Kirkland's Title VII race discrimination claims and denied it summary judgment on his retaliation claims. Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., No. 09-cv-10235, 2012 WL 4513499, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012). On motion for reconsideration, the District Court granted Cablevision summary judgment on Kirkland's retaliation claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over his pendent state law claims. Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., No. 09-cv-10235, 2013 WL 4509644, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2013).
In awarding Cablevision summary judgment, the District Court overlooked evidence raising a genuine factual dispute as to whether Cablevision's justifications for firing Kirkland were a pretext for race discrimination and retaliation. A rational jury, viewing the disputed evidence in Kirkland's favor, could find that Cablevision discriminated against Kirkland and fired him in violation of Title VII. Summary judgment is, therefore, inappropriate.
We VACATE the District Court's orders granting Cablevision summary judgment on Kirkland's discrimination and retaliation claims and dismissing Kirkland's pendent state law claims, and REMAND for trial.
We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and proceedings below.
"This court reviews grants of summary judgment de novo." Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003). Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). We review the evidence and draw all rational inferences in the non-movant's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
When a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must construe his submissions liberally and interpret them "to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994). Only "if it appears beyond
Kirkland's Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard.
Once an employee makes a prima facie case of either discrimination or retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to give a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the employer does so, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's explanation is a pretext for race discrimination or retaliation. Id. With respect to a discrimination claim, "once the [employer] has made a showing of a neutral reason for the complained of action, to defeat summary judgment ... the [employee's] admissible evidence must show circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer that the [employer's] employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination." Terry, 336 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to a retaliation claim, the employee's admissible evidence must show "that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer." Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 835 (2d Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013)).
While the District Court recognized that Kirkland had stated prima facie cases of race discrimination and retaliation, it held that Kirkland lacked sufficient evidence of pretext to rebut Cablevision's seemingly legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing him — primarily, poor performance reviews and affidavits from three regional managers whom Kirkland supervised.
We disagree with the District Court's conclusions.
The record contains enough evidence that, if credited, could support a jury's finding that Cablevision's rationale for Kirkland's treatment and eventual termination was a pretext for illegal race discrimination and retaliation.
Other examples of proffered evidence, which could support a finding of pretext, if at least several were believed, follow:
A jury might credit all of this proffered evidence, some of it, or none at all. But that is "left for the jury to decide at trial." Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 21 (2d Cir.2012) (vacating, in part, summary judgment for employer). And if at least some of this evidence is believed by a jury, that jury could also conclude that, despite Kirkland's negative performance reviews, his firing was "more likely than not based in whole or in part on discrimination," Terry, 336 F.3d at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted), and that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred "but-for" the alleged wrongful actions.
We vacate the orders of the District Court granting Cablevision summary judgment on Kirkland's Title VII race discrimination and retaliation claims and dismissing his pendent state law claims. The case is remanded for proceedings 15 consistent with this opinion.